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The puzzle is that three apparently incompatible claims are all true.
First: our reasons for choosing one alternative over another are not al-
ways comparable in strength. The reasons may be incommensurable.
Second: legal cases---at least hard cases-often demand that courts
choose among alternatives where the reasons for each alternative are in-
commensurable. Third: nonetheless, in such cases court decisions
should-ideally, at least-be based on the superiority of one set of rea-
sons over the others. But this is to compare the incomparable. How is
this possible?
I. WHAT INCOMMENSURABILITY IS
There is an essential preliminary: explaining the sense in which rea-
sons may be incommensurable. A literary example-the plight of one of
Charles Dickens' characters, Silas Wegg-is helpful here. Wegg has a
wooden leg and, much to his dismay, his amputated leg is the property of
someone else-Mr. Venus, who bought it to use in his business of making
and selling skeletons. Wegg complains: "I should not like ... to be what
I may call dispersed, a part of me here and a part of me there, but should
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wish to collect myself like a genteel person." To see the sense in which
reasons may be incommensurable, consider the following, distinctly non-
Dickensian analysis of Wegg's plight. This analysis begins with the ob-
servation that we--collectively as a society-have a reason to favor the
making of skeletons; we need them (or at least we did in the 19th cen-
tury) for various purposes such as anatomical illustration. Making the
skeletons means buying the necessary bones (other means of acquisition
exist, but for simplicity ignore them). So, it would seem at least that,
since making the skeletons means buying the bones, our reason for mak-
ing the skeletons-namely that we need them-is also a reason to buy
bones; and, in the particular case of Venus and Wegg, the need for skele-
tons gives Venus a reason to buy Wegg's leg. Of course, Wegg has a
reason not to allow Venus to buy his leg: namely, he is still attached to it,
not anatomically, of course, but in his attitude toward it. He does not
want to be "dispersed, . . . a part... here and a part... there." Which
reason is better? The reason to allow Venus to buy the leg, or the reason
not to? Arguably the former. What after all is Wegg going to do with
his leg? Presumably he would dispose of it; he doesn't really want it. He
just doesn't want to be "dispersed" by someone else's having it. So giving
the leg to Wegg is waste where there could be gain.
Dickens would not have liked this result. He objected to treating
Wegg's leg as a saleable piece of property. Wegg and his leg are part of
Dickens' protest against the ways in which the emerging industrialized
society of 19th century England allowed the buying and selling of various
aspects of human beings. But haven't we just shown that this protest is
irrational? Indeed, we have if we grant that our reason to make skele-
tons-our need for them-is also a reason to buy and sell bones. Sup-
pose that is true. Then what would Dickens have us do? Ignore that
reason? That certainly would be irrational; barring eventualities such as
lack of time or the well-grounded expectation that the reason is too triv-
ial to consider, it is irrational not to take a relevant reason into account.
So-given that it exists-we should take the reason to buy bones into
account, and if we do, in some cases surely our reason for buying and
selling may be better than our reason for not doing so. Thus, if we are to
be rational, certain aspects of human beings become saleable property-
just the result Dickens did not like.
The only way to avoid this result is to deny that our reason for mak-
ing skeletons is also a reason to buy bones. Then we cannot ask whether
that reason to buy bones is better than our reason not to, for the first
reason does not exist. Our reason to make skeletons and our reason not
to sell bones are incommensurable in that way--on the assumption, of
[Vol. 68:147
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course, that our reason for making skeletons is not also a reason to buy
bones. It does not matter here whether this assumption is true. The
point is merely to illustrate the following general pattern. Thus: suppose
one has a reason to perform an action A (making skeletons), where doing
A means doing B (selling bones); in such cases---other things being
equal-one's reason to do A is also a reason to do B. This is why it is so
natural, in the Wegg example, to assume that the reason to make skele-
tons is also a reason to sell bones. But of course, anyone viewing the
matter in a Dickensian spirit will respond that things are not equal since
we are dealing with aspects of human beings. Thus, the reason to make
skeletons is not a reason to sell bones, so the reason to make skeletons
and the reason not to sell are incommensurable-a result Dickens would
very much have liked.
II. EXAMPLES OF INCOMMENSURABILITY
Of course, compatibility with Dickens is hardly a reason to think
incommensurability really exists. Are there any genuinely convincing ex-
amples of incommensurability? That is, is the first claim-that our rea-
sons are often incommensurable-really true?
A. Love and Money
The following example should suffice. Suppose, as I am out walking
with my daughter, a stranger approaches and offers to buy her for a
$1,000,000. When I refuse, the stranger makes the same offer to Jones,
who also refuses. Jones acknowledges that he could use the money; he
would use it to pay off his bills and would invest the remainder, except
for a relatively small amount to finance a vacation. In light of these con-
siderations, he finds the prospect of $1,000,000 to be a fairly compelling
reason to sell his daughter. Nonetheless, he decides that he has better
reasons not to part with her; among other things, he would miss her.
However, as Jones candidly acknowledges, the result would be otherwise
were the price sufficiently high-say, $10,000,000. My refusal might be
thought to rest on similar grounds, for I also have reasons for having the
$1,000,000. Like Jones, my reasons are primarily financial: I too would
pay off bills and invest most of the rest. I also have a reason not to 'part
with my daughter: I love her. So, since I refuse to exchange her for the
money, surely I must think that my reason for keeping her is better than
my reason-provided by the prospect of the $1,000,000-for selling her
to the stranger. But this picture of my situation rests on a false assump-
tion: namely, that the prospect of $1,000,000 provides me with a reason
19921
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to sell my daughter. I have the financial reasons for having the money,
and-other things being equal-these reasons would also be reasons for
selling my daughter since getting the money means selling her. But other
things are not equal.
They are not because I love my daughter, and it is in part constitu-
tive of my attitude toward my daughter-the attitude I designate as pa-
rental love-that I refuse to count such financial considerations as
reasons to part with her. Indeed, I am shocked that Jones does so in the
case of his daughter. I think he does not really love her, at least not in
the way I love mine.1 Of course, I do not mean to suggest that what
parental love allows and disallows as a reason is well-defined. That is
certainly not true; in general, one discovers case by case what one will
and will not count as a reason.
Some will no doubt object that there are circumstances in which one
might sell a child one loves. Suppose Sally has two daughters; one will
die if she does not receive medical treatment costing $1,000,000. Sally
might sell the healthy daughter to raise the money. But she would still
not be like Jones. Jones recognizes the financial reasons to have the
money as reasons to sell his daughter; Sally recognizes saving the life of
one child as a reason to sell the other. Of course, she also might not
recognize the existence of such a reason; it might be constitutive of her
love for her children that she does not count saving the life of one as a
reason to sell the other.
But, someone is sure to object, one cannot make something fail to be
a reason merely by refusing to acknowledge that it is. I do not recognize
the financial reasons to have the money as reasons to sell my daughter.
But surely I might be wrong. After all, it is quite clear that people can be
wrong about such things. For example, suppose Mason is a gourmet
who works as a restaurant reviewer for newspapers and magazines.
When his doctor tells him he has gout and must stop eating the rich
French food in which he delights, Mason persists in his gourmet pur-
suits. He thinks of himself as a badly injured warrior who, although
doomed to defeat, defiantly refuses to cease fighting to achieve his ideal-
the ideal for the gourmet Mason being the refinement of appetite as a
source of pleasure. Mason takes this attitude because it is constitutive of
the way in which he values being a gourmet that he refuses to recognize
1. One may object that all it shows is that my daughter is worth an infinite amount of money.
She is on the scale, just above every finite amount of money. However this simply misses the point.
The point is that it is in part constitutive of the attitude we designate as parental love that I will not
measure my daughter's value in money. What I count as measuring and not measuring worth de-
fines my attitude. To say that my child is worth an infinite amount of money just misses this point.
[VCol. 68:147
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health considerations as a reason not to enjoy gourmet food. While Ma-
son's friends do not doubt the sincerity of his commitment, they try to
convince him that he is mistaken in thinking that the health considera-
tions are not a reason to stop. The friends could certainly be right. Ma-
son cannot make it the case that health considerations are not a reason
simply by committing himself to the view that they are not. The exist-
ence or non-existence of a reason is not simply a matter of what one's
commitments are. Mason thinks the health considerations are not a rea-
son, but he could be wrong.
There are three ways in which Mason could be mistaken. First, Ma-
son might be mistaken about what morality requires. Suppose, for the
sake of argument, that it was immoral-objectively morally wrong-for
Mason to continue to enjoy gourmet food at the expense of his health.
Then Mason would certainly be wrong in thinking that the health con-
siderations are not a reason to abandon his gourmet pursuits. Mason
might also be wrong about morality in another way, for he might be
morally required to count the health considerations as a reason even if it
was not morally wrong to continue his gourmet pursuits. We are some-
times subject to such requirements. For example, suppose I can save five
lives by diverting the runaway train but only at the cost of killing one
other person. Even if it is morally correct to divert the train, the cost of
killing one is still a reason not to, and one who thought otherwise would
be mistaken in his or her moral assessment of the situation.
Now suppose that it is not objectively morally wrong to enjoy fine
food at the expense of one's health; morality leaves that open as an op-
tion, and suppose as well that Mason is not morally required to recognize
the health considerations as a reason to curtail his gourmet pleasures. It
is at least arguable that these suppositions could be true; the degree to
which I am morally required to take account of my health is a matter of
considerable controversy. Even in such a case, Mason might still be mis-
taken. The mistake is not about what morality requires, the mistake is
about what is better for Mason, about what his personal well-being con-
sists in. Like all of us, Mason has organized his life around certain cen-
tral plans and projects. Each of us adopts different sets of plans and
projects, but each of us organizes his or her life around some such set,
and our well-being depends crucially on the successful realization of the
plans and projects in that set. One of Mason's projects is realizing the
ideal of the refinement of appetite as a source of pleasure, where, on Ma-
son's understanding of the ideal, the health considerations do not count
as a reason to give up his gourmet goals. Mason cannot count the health
considerations as a reason and realize the ideal so understood. But he
19921
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
has other plans and projects beside his gourmet pursuits, and, in light of
those projects, it could be that he would more effectively promote his
well-being if he took the health considerations into account in deciding
what to do rather than ignoring them. Then Mason would certainly be
mistaken in not counting the health considerations as a reason. His re-
fusal to do so might be a manifestation of denial, denial that he has a
serious health problem. This is the second of the three ways in which
Mason may be mistaken. The third way is simply that he may lack ade-
quate information. Suppose he mistakenly believes that gout is a trivial
ailment and so mistakenly believes that gout is not a reason to stop eating
gourmet food. If he knew the truth, he would think his well-being de-
pended on curing the gout and would therefore regard the health consid-
erations as a reason.
But just as there are cases in which people are wrong, there are also
cases in which they are right. The selling-my-daughter case is one of the
latter. The existence or non-existence of a reason may not entirely be a
matter of what one's commitments are, but commitment plays a role.
Parental love is one of the clearest examples: in that case, because of my
attitude, certain reasons do not exist. Of course, even in the case of pa-
rental love one could be wrong; one could mistakenly think that certain
considerations are not a reason. Consider the example in which Sally
confronts the dilemma of selling one child to obtain life-saving medical
treatment for her other child. Suppose Sally thinks that saving the life of
one is not a reason to sell the other. Here there are the same three pos-
sibilities of mistake that there are in the Mason case. It might be morally
better to sell one child to save the other's life; then, Sally would be mis-
taken in thinking that saving the one child's life was not a reason. She
would also be mistaken if she was morally required to count saving the
life of one as a reason. Alternatively, Sally might be mistaken about
what promotes her own well-being; suppose that, despite loving the child
to be sold, it would actually promote her well-being to sell that child to
save the other. Finally, Sally might have inadequate information. For
example, she might-mistakenly-think that saving the one child's life
was not a reason because she mistakenly thought the other-sold--child
would not lead a happy life.
But we are not focusing here on selling one child to save the other.
What we are asking here is whether my using the $1,000,000 to pay off
bills and to invest provides a reason to sell my daughter. I am not in this
case helping any one else with the money; I am just making my own life
more comfortable. Perhaps it is possible to be mistaken even in this case.
Again, we have the same three possibilities. It might-although this is
[Vol. 68:147
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wildly implausible-be morally wrong not to sell my daughter to gain
money for investment; or-equally implausibly-I might be morally re-
quired to count the financial considerations as a reason to sell. Somewhat
more plausibly, I might be mistaken about what promotes my well-being.
Suppose it would be better for me to sell my daughter since my love for
her is a destructive love that is destroying my life. Blinded by love, I
refuse to acknowledge this. Finally, I would be mistaken in refusing to
count the financial considerations as a reason because I am inadequately
informed. At least it is arguable that this is possible. Suppose I believe
my daughter is a kind and generous person when in fact she sells drugs to
elementary school children. As long as I believe she is kind and gener-
ous, I do not regard the financial considerations as a reason to sell her,
but suppose I would change my mind if I knew the truth. I would think
that all along I had a reason to sell her; I just did not realize that because
I was mistaken about her true character.
We do not have to decide how plausible these various possibilities of
mistake really are. What we want to focus on is the case in which it is
not immoral not to sell my daughter; in which I am not blinded by love,
or in any relevant way mistaken about what promotes my well-being; and
in which I am adequately informed on all relevant points. Could I be
mistaken in thinking that the financial considerations are not a reason to
sell? Certainly not. In such a case, if I think the financial considerations
are not such a reason, then they really are not.2 Any case in which I
would be mistaken, would be a case in which it was immoral not to sell
my daughter, or in which I was relevantly deficient in self-understanding,
or in which I was lacking relevant information.
I take it to be clear then that the daughter-selling example illustrates
the following possibility: one has reasons to perform an action A, where
one doing A means not doing B, yet the reasons to do A are not reasons
to not do B. Such cases give rise to incommensurabilities. Thus, in the
daughter-selling example, I have reasons to have the money, and I have
reasons to keep my daughter. To get the money, I have to part with my
daughter. It is natural to assume that the reasons to have the money are
also reasons to sell my daughter, so it is natural to ask: are reasons to sell
her better or worse than the reasons to keep her? But-and this is the
incommensurability-my financial reasons to have the money and my
2. This sort of connection between thinking something so and its really being so is not unique
to this case. See Richard Warner, Incorrigibility, in OBJECTIONS TO PHYSICALISM 185 (Howard
Robinson ed., forthcoming 1992); Richard Warner, Is the Body a Physical Object, in NATURALISM:
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (Steven Wagner & Richard Warner eds., forthcoming 1992); Richard
Warner, Why is Logic A Pr'ori?, 72 THE MoNISr 40 (1989).
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reasons to keep my daughter are not commensurable in this way, for, as
long as I love my daughter in the way I do, the financial reasons cannot
be reasons to sell her.
Parental love is, as we will see, just one example of an attitude that
gives rise to incommensurability. There are many such attitudes. They
all involve taking considerations to be or not be reasons, and there are
cases in which, by virtue of being in the attitude, the reason exists.
B. The Importance of Incommensurability
So far incommensurability may not seem very significant, for there
is nothing particularly problematic about the daughter case. After all, I
have no difficulty in deciding what to do; I have a reason to keep my
daughter-my love for her; keeping her means not having the money,
so-other things being equal-my reason for keeping my daughter is a
reason not to have the money. And: other things certainly are equal, so
my love of my daughter is a reason not to have the money, and I take this
reason not to have the money to be a better reason that the financial
reasons for having the money. The decision is an easy one.
But there are cases in which incommensurability does make decision
difficult. Thus: a sadistic Nazi officer apprehends a mother and her twin
five-year old children.3 To satisfy his sadism, the officer says he will kill
one of the children and asks the mother to choose which it shall be. If
she does not choose, he will kill them both. The mother's dilemma is
that it is constitutive of her love for each child that she refuses to recog-
nize saving the life of one as a reason to kill the other. Yet her love for
each child gives her a reason to save that child, and both will die if she
does not sacrifice one. However, to choose one over the other requires
that she cease to love one-at least that she cease to love that one in the
way she presently does. This is not something she can do at will-even if
she should want to. This makes rational decision impossible. There is no
way she can act for reasons. It is not even possible for her to rationally
decide by, for example, flipping a coin; to do so is to count saving the life
of one as a reason to choose that the other should die. As long as she
loves both children, she does not recognize the existence of such a reason.
This is what makes incommensurability important. It can be a bar-
rier to rational action, action for reasons. Sometimes it is a particularly
insurmountable and soul-rending barrier, but not always. Sometimes the
barrier is relatively easily overcome. Seeing what is involved in these
relatively easy cases is essential to understanding the role of the courts in
3. This example forms the central theme of WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE (1979).
[Vol. 68:147
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cases of incommensurability. To this end, consider the following
example.
C. Escaping Incommensurability
Suppose Jones and I are avid sailors. We each spend about $400 a
month on sailing (yacht club dues, boat storage, and so on). For Jones
the choice is between spending the $400 on sailing and saving it for re-
tirement. He has reasons to save for retirement, and, since that means
not spending the money on sailing, his reasons to save are---other things
being equal-reasons not to sail. For Jones, other things are equal, so his
reasons to save are reason not to sail, but he takes his reasons to sail to be
better than his retirement-saving reasons not to. Like Jones I have rea-
sons to save money toward retirement, but unlike Jones I do not see these
reasons as reasons not to sail--even though sailing means not saving.
My attitude is similar to my attitude toward my daughter: I am commit-
ted to sailing, and it is in part constitutive of my commitment that I
refuse to recognize saving for retirement as a reason not to spend money
on sailing. In this sense, I could literally be said to love sailing.
But, in this case, my love is limited. To see how, suppose the cost of
sailing suddenly rose to $1000 a month. Jones would stop sailing at this
point, for he would take his reasons to save $1000 toward retirement as a
reason not to sail, and he would take that reason to be stronger than his
reason to sail. I would also stop sailing, but not quite for the same rea-
sons. Confronted with the need to pay $1000, I would abandon-or at
least change the nature of-my commitment to sailing, for I would-
sadly and reluctantly-acknowledge that saving $1000 a month for re-
tirement was a reason not to sail. I differ from Jones in that my decision
involves a fundamental change in my attitude toward sailing, a ceasing to
love, a change that does not occur in Jones. As we will see, similar
changes of attitude are often involved when courts decide cases involving
incommensurabilities.
So far I have focused on love and money, for they provide clear
examples of incommensurability. But incommensurability extends well
beyond this range. For example, suppose Katrina is a Russian engineer
in the 1930s; she favors the development of the untouched Russian
Steppe. She thinks that
[o]ur steppe will truly become ours only when we come with columns
of tractors and break that thousand-year-old virgin soil. On a far flung
front, we must wage war. We must burrow into the earth, break rocks,
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dig mines, construct houses. We must take from the earth.4
Her vision is of humans as masters of the earth, transforming it in their
image, and she emphasizes the enormous benefits to the Russian people
of an industrialized steppe.
But she has never seen the steppe, and when she finally travels
through it, she is overcome with awe at the untamed and untouched vast-
ness of it. Insofar as she is in awe, she will not think that the benefits of
exploitation are a reason to "break rocks" and "dig mines." It is consti-
tutive of her awe that she does not recognize such benefits as a reason.
To find in such benefits a reason to deface the steppe is not to be in awe
of the steppe. At least, this is one clear sense of the word "awe;" I have
no wish to deny that the word might also be used to designate differently
constituted attitudes. The point to emphasize is that Katrina's awe does
not mean that she does not have reasons to exploit the steppe; we may
suppose that she still has the same reasons she had before her trip to the
steppe. One and the same person can both be in awe of the steppe and
persuaded by the case for exploitation. Of course, one cannot be in awe
and simultaneously acknowledge that the benefits of exploitation are a
reason to dig up the steppe. The attitudes have to alternate, but alternate
they may. To resolve the conflict, Katrina must abandon one or the
other attitude.
One could give similar examples involving, for example, beauty, no-
bility, honor, loyalty, and friendship.5 Examples are sufficient to show
the existence and pervasiveness of incommensurability; however, there is
a compelling theoretical explanation as well.
4. This passage is from a 1929 textbook used in the Soviet Union for the education of twelve to
fourteen year olds. Albert E. Burke, Influence of Man Upon Nature-The Russian View: A Case
Study, in MAN'S ROLE IN CHANGING THE FACE OF THE EARTH 1048 (William Thomas ed., Uni-
versity of Chicago Press 1956). The passage is quoted in CHRISTOPHER STONE, EARTH AND OTHER
ETHICS 112 note (1987).
5. Loyalty is a particularly clear case. Suppose Jones and I are revolutionaries. An official in
the government we oppose approaches me and offers me $1,000,000 to reveal names, hiding places,
and plans of my fellow revolutionaries. I refuse. He makes the same offer to Jones, who also refuses.
Jones refuses because the price is too low. He would not betray the revolutionary cause for less than
$10,000,000. Jones makes a comparison. He does so because he regards the value to him of loyalty
to the revolution as comparable to the value to him of various amounts of money. His is worth less
then $10,000,000; more than any lesser amount. I might be thought to be like Jones. After all, I do
refuse to betray the revolution, so my loyalty must be worth more to me than $1,000,000. But I do
not refuse because I make a comparison. I refuse precisely because I refuse to measure the value of
my loyalty in money. It is in part constitutive of what I mean by loyalty that I do not regard it as for
sale, as having a value measurable in money. There is no amount of money that is the equivalent in




D. Incommensurability and Value
The source of incommensurability ies in the nature of value--or
better, of valuing. In one central and important sense of the word, to
value something is to regard it as a source of reasons for action, where
the reason consists in the doing, experiencing, or having of the valued
itemfor its own sake, not as the realization of any other end. For exam-
ple, if I love-And, in that way, value-my daughter, then I have a rea-
son to spend time with her, educate her, look after her health, and so on.
Now I may do some of these things as means to ends. I may, for exam-
ple, educate her as a means to giving her a secure future with reasonable
career prospects. But, given that I love her, I may also provide for and
participate in her education simply for the sake of doing so. I regard
"because it would educate her" as-in and of itself-a reason for action.
Of course, the forms of parental love are various, and some who love
their children may not find such a reason in the prospect of their chil-
dren's education. But to love one's child is, in part, to have reasons to do
things-different things for different people-simply for the sake of do-
ing those things for the child. In general the nature and extent of the
value one places on something is, at least in part, a function of the rea-
sons one's evaluative attitude provides.
This is where the link comes between valuing and incommensurabil-
ity: the nature and extent of the value one places on something is in part
defined by what reasons one's evaluative attitude allows and disallows.
The examples of incommensurability strongly support this point. I do
not, for example, count as loving my daughter unless I refuse to count
the financial considerations as a reason to sell her. Katrina's awe is con-
stituted in part by her refusing to recognize the benefits of exploitation as
a reason to "break rocks" and "dig mines." Incommensurability is built
into the very nature of valuing. In valuing, incommensurability is the
rule, not the exception. Commensurability should be seen as an excep-
tional-and often very important-achievement.
III. THREE CASES OF INCOMMENSURABILITY IN THE LAW
A. Environmental Law
The second of the three claims with which we began is that legal
cases-at least hard cases--often demand that the court make a choice
among alternatives that are incommensurable. This claim may seem
very puzzling, for consider the contrast between Katrina and the courts.
Incommensurability, as we have explained it, is a very personal matter.
It is a matter of what one's evaluative attitudes are, attitudes like love
19921
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and awe. Katrina's awe leads Katrina to reject the benefits of exploita-
tion as a reason to deface the steppe, but courts are not suppose to decide
cases on such a personal basis. The decision is not supposed to depend
on the particular values the court holds, values that the litigants and
others in society may or may not share. The court is to decide on a far
more impersonal basis. Courts are institutions designated by the state to
decide a certain range of disputes. Typically the disputing parties argue
for different decisions, each side offering a justification for its position,
and the court's institutional responsibility is to decide based on the supe-
riority of one justification over the other.6 But there is a presupposition of
this description of the courts role-a presupposition of commensurabil-
ity. This presupposition is--or at least appears to be-indefensible, for:
first, incommensurability is pervasive in the law; second, this at least
seems to undermine the idea that courts should decide based on the supe-
riority of one justification over the other. I begin by supporting the first
claim with examples, the claim that incommensurability is pervasive.
It is natural to think otherwise; at least, it is when confronted with
the practical reality of framing social policy and deciding legal cases.
For example, a recent EPA committee report endorses "risk analysis" as
a way to approach environmental problems.7 According to the commit-
tee, such analysis "allows many environmental problems to be measured
and compared in common terms, and it allows different risk reduction
options to be evaluated from a common basis."' 8 The committee warns
against the serious danger of not employing such a ranking: "If finite
resources are expended on lower-priority problems at the expense of
higher-priority risks, then society will face needlessly high risks."9 The
assumption here is that there are no significant, or at least no inelimin-
able, incommensurabilities. Our reasons for and against various environ-
mental options are to be ranked as better and worse on a common scale.
The committee recognizes, of course, that finding a common scale
may be problematic, and the bulk of its report consists in identifying and
analyzing several difficulties. In its discussion of more or less technical
6. Of course, the court is not limited to the justifications advanced by the parties; the court
may think some other justification is better than either. Having noted this possibility, let us, for
simplicity, put it to one side. The crucial point is that it is precisely the institutional role of courts to
decide in ways appropriately backed by justifying considerations. I take it to be clear and uncon-
troversial that courts have such an institutional role.
7. SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. 91-155259,
REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
app. a (Sept. 1990).




difficulties with risk assessment, the report identifies the following "addi-
tional difficulty." They note that any attempt
to compare and rank environmental risks [involves] inevitable value
judgments .... For example, are health risks posed to the aged more
or less serious than health risks posed to infants? Are risks of cancer
more or less serious than threats to reproductive processes? Compar-
ing the risks posed to human populations with the risks posed to eco-
systems may be even more difficult.1°
The difficulty here is not just that we tend to disagree in our "inevitable"
value judgments-although that, of course, is serious enough. Incom-
mensurability is an equally serious difficulty-and equally inevitable. Af-
ter all, the committee enjoins us to consider "all effects on humans and
societies . . . .that may result from environmental problems."' " The
report criticizes an earlier study because it limited its concern "to only a
few of the services produced by ecosystems, and ignored the more com-
plex, long term interconnectedness of all living things on earth." Given
the breadth of the concerns, incommensurability is unavoidable.
Examples bear this out. I begin with an anecdotal one. By interna-
tional treaty the Antarctic is the most stringently environmentally pro-
tected region of comparable size. The principal draftsman of the
legislation that implemented the treaty for the United States reports that
the main reason the parties with whom he worked wanted to preserve the
Antarctic was out of a kind of awe for the region; nothing else on earth
on that scale had remained as untouched by humans.' 2 Awe may well
have supported the stringent restrictions. Suppose-as in our earlier
Russian engineer example-it was constitutive of the awe that one would
not recognize the benefits of exploitation as a reason to develop the
Antarctic. As long as awe determined the decision, the choice between
exploitation and preservation would be easy. Of course, the draftsman
does not say whether this was the case, and this is one thing that makes
the example a good one. It not only illustrates incommensurability but
also shows the silent and unacknowledged role it may play. But we do
not have to rely on speculation and imagination to provide examples of
incommensurability in the environmental law area.
The Clean Air Act creates, or at least acknowledges, various incom-
mensurabilities. Under § 7409 of the act, the EPA Administrator is to
set natural ambient air quality standards (NAAQSs) at levels necessary
to protect public health and welfare; in determining the levels, the Ad-
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id. at app. a, 28-29 (emphasis deleted). The deleted portion reads, "excluding health ef-
fects." The committee considers these of course, but under a separate heading.
12. STONE, supra note 4, at 95-96.
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ministrator is not to consider the feasibility (technological and economic)
of meeting the standard. 13 The courts have accepted this aspect of the
act, holding that NAAQSs will be upheld as longs as the Administrator
had a rational basis for thinking that the level set was necessary to pro-
tect health and welfare. This creates an incommensurability.
To see why, suppose we are designing a factory and we want to
minimize pollution. When we tell our engineers the minimal level of pol-
lution that we find acceptable, they reply that it is neither technologically
not economically feasible to design the factory in such a way. Now this
lack of feasibility is certainly a reason not to design the factory in that
way, and--other things being equal-a reason not to design a factory in a
certain way is certainly also a reason not to have a legal rule that requires
that it be so designed. In such a case, we should adopt the rule only if
the reasons to have the rule are better than the reason-infeasibility-not
to have the rule. But § 7409 tells us not to make this kind of comparison
in setting NAAQSs. How can this be rational? It is not rational to ig-
nore a relevant reason (exceptional circumstances aside). We made this
point when discussing Dickens and Wegg's leg. Now the possibility fan-
cifully illustrated arises in the real-world context of environmental legis-
lation. Since it is not rational to ignore a relevant reason, we must, if
§ 7409 is not to condemn us to irrationality, interpret that section as
saying that feasibility considerations cannot count as a reason against im-
posing an emissions standard. So interpreted, what underlies the section
is the placing of a certain value on clean air, a valuing of clean air in part
constituted by not recognizing feasibility as a reason not to impose cer-
tain clean air standards. Section 7409 reflects this attitude, or at least
reflects the legislative judgment that, as a society, we do (or at least
should) have that attitude.
Some may object that the legislature actually made a quite different
judgement. The objection is that, where meeting a certain NAAQSs
would not be feasible, the legislature did regard this as a reason not to
impose the standard; however, the legislature also thought that there
were good reasons to impose such NAAQSs, for doing so would provide
an incentive to develop better and cheaper pollution control technology.
The legislature passed § 7409 because it thought the reasons to have such
NAAQSs were better than the reasons not to. The problem with this
objection is that the legislature could not have been in any position to
make such a judgment. Whether providing incentives is a better reason
than infeasibility depends on detailed facts about the state of technology
13. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1990).
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and the state of the economy; moreover, these facts will vary from indus-
try to industry, and they will vary over time as technology develops and
the economy changes. Even if the legislature could have determined, at
the time of passing § 7409, that the incentive reasons are better than the
infeasibility reasons, the legislature could not possibly reliably determine
this for the future. If the legislature tried to make such a judgment, it
tried to do the impossible. A much more plausible view of § 7409 is that
it expresses a valuing of clean air in part constituted by not recognizing
feasibility as a reason not to impose certain clean air standards.
Section 7409 is by no means the only part of the Clean Air Act that
raises incommensurability issues. Section 7411, for example, does so as
well-but in an importantly different way. The way incommensurability
issues arise here illustrates an important aspect of incommensurability as
it figures in the law, so I will develop the example at some length. Sec-
tion 7411 directs the Administrator to set emissions standards for "new"
stationary sources of pollution; these are sources constructed or modified
after the effective date of applicable regulation. The standard is to reflect
"the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of
the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost
of achieving such reduction, and any nonair quality health and environ-
mental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator determines
has been adequately demonstrated."' 4 Here, clearly, lack of economic
feasibility is a reason not to impose a standard, for the Administrator is
to take cost into account. There is no inconsistency between §§ 7409 and
7411. Meeting the NAAQSs is a matter of the combined level of pollu-
tion from various sources; we may still meet the NAAQSs even if we
allow feasibility considerations to play a role in setting standards for
some particular sources.
The point to emphasize is that incommensurability issues arise even
in the context of § 7411. To see how, note first that the section does not
say what counts as taking "into consideration the cost." That is, it does
not say what kind of feasibility considerations can qualify as a reason not
to impose an emission standard. The issue is a critical one, for it is en-
tirely possible to value clean air in a way that is defined in part by ac-
knowledging only a limited reason-providing role for feasibility
considerations. Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus 15 illustrates
the point. The EPA set emissions standards for new or modified cement
plants. Portland Cement sought judicial review on the ground that the
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (1990) (emphasis added).
15. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
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Administrator did not comply with § 7411 by taking "into consideration
the cost" of meeting the standard. The Administrator had estimated the
total capital and operating costs of meeting the standard and had deter-
mined that the industry as a whole could afford them. 16 Portland Ce-
ment argued that the statute required a quantified cost-benefit analysis.
Portland Cement's argument is not without merit. Suppose the Ad-
ministrator actually had prepared a cost-benefit analysis which showed
that the costs significantly exceeded the benefits. Could the Administra-
tor simply ignore the results of the analysis? Surely not; it would not be
rational to do so--on the assumption, that is, that the analysis provides a
reason not to impose the standard. To make the point again: it is not
rational to ignore a relevant reason (exceptional circumstances aside). If
the analysis provides a reason not to impose the standard, then the Ad-
ministrator should impose the standard only if the reasons to have the
standard are better than the reason-that costs exceed benefits-not to.
Of course, in the actual case, the Administrator did not prepare a cost-
benefit analysis. But suppose he had the time and the resources to do so,
and suppose that, given the high costs of meeting the standard, one had
good reason to wonder whether the costs did not exceed the benefits.
Then, isn't Portland Cement right in thinking that taking "into consider-
ation the costs" means preparing a cost-benefit analysis?
It certainly is-on the assumption, which we made above, that such
an analysis can provide a reason not to impose a standard. I suggest that
we regard § 7411 as rejecting this assumption; we should see the section
as allowing only a limited reason-providing role for feasibility considera-
tions-in particular as disallowing cost-benefit analyses as reasons. If we
read the section in this way, the Administrator's approach makes sense.
He does not prepare or consider a cost-benefit analysis because, under
§ 7411, such an analysis cannot provide a reason not to impose the stan-
dard. In support of this reading, compare § 7409. The § 7409 provision
reflects the fact that we value clean air in a way that is in part defined by
the refusal to recognize feasibility at all as a reason to impose NAAQSs.
Why would we then do a complete about-face in § 7411 and allow any
sort of feasibility consideration to qualify as a reason to not set an emis-
sions standard?
The Portland Cement court agreed with the Administrator that a
cost-benefit analysis was not required. But the court did not reach its
16. The Administrator decided that the costs could be passed on to consumers without signifi-
cantly affecting the ability of cement manufacturers to compete with steel, asphalt, and aluminum
manufacturers. Id. at 387-88.
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decision on incommensurability grounds. The court noted that prepar-
ing a cost-benefit analysis would conflict with the time constraints im-
posed on the Administrator by the Clean Air Act; it also argued that it
would be virtually impossible to quantify in dollars the benefit of the
emissions standard to ambient air quality. The court's arguments are not
particularly convincing-at least they did not convince Congress, for in
1977 Congress amended the Act by adding § 7617. This section requires
that, prior to imposing a standard under § 7411, the Administrator shall
prepare an "economic impact assessment." 17 The assessment is to ana-
lyze the costs of complying as well as various market effects (such as
increased consumer costs), and the effects on energy use. The effect of
the amendment is unclear, however, since it also provides that nothing in
it shall be construed to "alter the basis on which a standard or regulation
is promulgated"' 8 or to "authorize or require any judicial review of any
such standard or regulation .. ,,19
So § 7617 leaves it unclear what sorts of considerations count as a
feasibility reason not to impose a standard. This unclarity runs through-
out environmental law; it is one of its most central and problematic
themes. Where we recognize feasibility considerations as reasons, we are
still unclear about exactly what sorts of considerations we count as rea-
sons. It may well be that we are often like our hypothetical Russian
engineer. In one frame of mind, we acknowledge considerations as rea-
sons that, in another mind set, we disallow. An appreciation of our
problems and perplexities here casts a revealing light on the EPA's recent
endorsement of "risk analysis" as a way to allow "environmental
problems to be measured and compared in common terms" and allow
different risk reduction options to be evaluated from a common basis.20
What this approach ignores is incommensurability, and to ignore this is
to ignore a major source of our perplexities and quandaries over environ-
mental law.
. Property Law
Incommensurability also arises in non-environmental cases, of
course. Moore v. The Regents of the University of California2' is an inter-
esting example. In Moore, a UCLA medical center doctor removed John
Moore's spleen in the course of treating Moore's leukemia. Abnormal
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7617 (1990).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7617(e)(1) (1990).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 7617(e)(3) (1990).
20. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
21. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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genetic material in the removed spleen had great commercial value, and
without obtaining Moore's consent, the doctor and medical center mar-
keted the material for a considerable profit.22 Moore sued, claiming
(among other things) that he had a property right in the marketed mate-
rial. The California Supreme Court denied this claim primarily on the
ground that tens of thousands of researchers use human cell lines stored
in tissue repositories, and that to recognize Moore's claim as valid would
expose all these researchers to similar legal claims. The resulting liability
explosion would greatly hinder research.
The strength of the majority's position is that avoiding a serious dis-
ruption in scientific research is certainly a reason not to make illegal the
use of human cell lines without donor consent. Not making unconsented
use illegal means not recognizing a property right for Moore in the ge-
netic material, so-other things being equal-avoiding disruption in re-
search is a reason not to recognize the property right.
Justice Mosk, in dissent, argues, essentially, that other things are not
equal. He contends that
our society acknowledges a profound ethical imperative to respect the
human body as the physical and temporal expression of the unique
human persona .... '[R]esearch [of the sort involved in this case]
tends to treat the human body as a commodity-a means to a profita-
ble end. The dignity and sanctity with which we regard the human
whole.., are absent when we allow researchers to further their own
interests without the patient's participation by using a patient's cells as
the basis for a marketable product.'
23
One interpretation of these remarks is that Mosk flatly asserts without
explanation that marketing the genetic material is inconsistent with the
dignity with which we regard the "human whole." Another, more inter-
esting interpretation is that Mosk asserts an incommensurability. Thus:
the dignity with which we regard the "human whole" is in part consti-
tuted by a refusal to recognize the research value of a body part as a
reason to sell it (or at least by the refusal to recognize such a reason
without the patient's consent to such a sale). When we do recognize such
a reason, the "dignity and sanctity with which we regard the human
whole ... are absent."'24
It is impossible to tell from Mosk's remarks which position he takes.
However, many who object to "commodification" of the human body are
22. In exchange for this material, the doctor was given 75,000 shares of stock in the private
company that bought the material, and became a paid consultant for the company. In addition, the
doctor and UCLA together were given more than $1,000,000 over a three year period. Id at 482.
23. Id. at 515-16 (Mosk, J. dissenting) (quoting Mary T. Danforth, Cells, Sales, & Royalties:
The Patient's Right to a Portion of the Profit, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 179, 190 (1990)).
24. Id. at 516.
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clearly best interpreted as asserting such an incommensurability. Mar-
garet Radin, for example, argues that it is wrong to think of "bodily
integrity as a fungible object... We feel discomfort or even insult, and
we fear degradation or even loss of the value involved, when bodily integ-
rity is conceived of as a fungible object."' 25 By a fungible object, Radin
means one "replaceable with money."' 26 To think of the body and its
parts as not fungible is to refuse to recognize the commercial value of a
body part as a reason to sell it. Of course, not everyone shares this atti-
tude. The majority in Moore does not, for example.27 Again, my point
here is not to resolve the disagreement but to illustrate how issues of
incommensurability arise in the law.
C. Contract Law
I consider a final example to show that incommensurability issues
arise in more mundane contexts. Contract law is a good example. A
contract is a legally enforceable promise, and, because of the nature of
promising, incommensurabilities figure prominently in contract law.
Part of promising is adopting a certain attitude toward future action, an
attitude defined in part by the refusal to recognize certain considerations
as reasons. For example, I promise to accompany you to the doctor on
Tuesday; you face a possible diagnosis of cancer and want moral support.
However, when Tuesday arrives, it is a beautiful day, and I think that it
would be quite enjoyable to take a walk. Taking the walk means not
accompanying you; so, since the prospect of enjoyment is a reason for me
to take the walk, then--other things being equal-it is also thereby a
reason not to go with you. But other things are not equal here, for I have
promised to provide support in the face of a possible diagnosis of cancer.
When I promised, I made a certain commitment, a commitment consti-
tuted in part by the refusal to count considerations like the prospect of an
25. Margaret Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1880-81 (1987).
26. Id. at 1880.
27. Consider their comment on Mosk's dissent:
I share Justice Mosk's sense of outrage, but I cannot follow its path. His eloquent paean to
the human spirit illuminates the problem, not the solution. Does it uplift or degrade the
"unique human persona" to treat human tissue as a fungible article of commerce? Would
it advance or impede the human condition, spiritually or scientifically, by delivering the
majestic force of the law behind the plaintiff's claim? I do not know the answers to these
troubling questions, nor am I willing-like Justice Mosk-to treat them ... as issues...
susceptible of judicial resolution.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 497-98 (Arabian, J., concurring). This simply misses the point. If it is constitu-
tive of our attitude toward the "human whole" that we do not regard its value as measurable in
money, then this question is easy to answer: "Does it uplift or degrade the unique human persona to
treat human tissue as a fungible article of commerce?" The answer is that it degrades it. The major-
ity clearly assumes that the relevant values are comparable and that the problem is to determine
their relative value along a common scale.
1992)
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
enjoyable walk as a reason not to do as I promised. Of course, one can
promise and still properly regard some considerations as reasons to break
the promise. I may have sufficient reason to break my promise if,
through no fault of my own, accompanying you means leaving my two
year old daughter unattended in a city park. The point is that having an
adequate reason to break a promise is a two-stage matter. First, the con-
siderations in question must be the kind of considerations that, in the
circumstances, can be such a reason-e.g., the safety of a young child, as
opposed to the enjoyment of a walk. Second, the reason provided by
those considerations must be better than the reasons to keep the promise.
We can see this two stage structure in a number of contract doc-
trines. The doctrine of impracticability is an example. The doctrine is
that a promisor may be excused from performance under two conditions:
first, an unexpected contingency makes performance commercially im-
practicable-i. e., especially difficult or impossible; and, second, it is not
the case that the promisor seeking to be excused ought to bear the risk of
loss from such a contingency. 28 The first condition identifies a type of
consideration-the relevant unexpected contingency-as the kind of con-
sideration that can be a reason not to keep a promise; it tells us that such
a consideration is relevantly like the endangering of the child, not like the
enjoyment of the walk. Given that one can show such a contingency, one
then has to show that the reasons the contingency provides are better
than the reasons one has to keep the promise. The second condition indi-
cates that this is a matter of risk assignment; one must show that one
ought not to bear the risk of loss from the contingency. But then why
have the first condition at all? Why not simply say that, where keeping
the promise will impose a loss on one, one may be excused from perform-
ing if one can show that one should not bear the risk of that loss?
Clearly, impracticability doctrine does not work this way. Arguments
about risk assignment are not relevant unless one can meet the threshold
condition of showing an appropriate unexpected contingency.
Why should the doctrine have this structure? Because of incom-
mensurability. To see this, suppose that I am wholesaler of hair gel, and
I contract with you, a retailer, to supply you with all the hair gel you
need at $1 a tube. Then, unexpectedly, the costs of making hair gel rise
sharply with the result that I am just breaking even on our contract. I
have a reason to stop selling you hair gel for $1 a tube-namely, I am not
making any money by doing so. So, since not selling to you means break-
ing my promise to you, I have-other things being equal-a reason to
28. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTs § 9.6, at 677-89 (1982).
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break my promise. But are other things equal? After all, I have prom-
ised, and that is to adopt an attitude toward future action that disallows
certain sorts of considerations as reasons to break the promise. So what
about only breaking even? It is my reason to stop delivering hair gel to
you, but stopping means breaking my promise. Is only breaking even a
reason to do that? Suppose that it is not. Then I cannot argue that my
reason to break my promise-that I am only breaking even-is better
than my reasons for keeping the promise. There is no comparison of this
sort to make since my only breaking even is not a reason to break the
promise.
And this is precisely the position of the current law. Under current
impracticability doctrine, although the rise in costs was unexpected, it
does not make performance commercially impracticable. So I do not
meet the threshold test of the first condition, and I cannot argue that I
should not bear the risk of loss from the unexpected contingency. That is
to argue that my reasons for breaking the promise-my only breaking
even-is a better reason than my reason for keeping the promise. But my
only breaking even is not a reason for not keeping my promise.
But perhaps the current law should be different. Suppose that if I
stopped selling to you, I could sell the hair gel at a considerable profit-
such a large profit that I could pay you whatever damages you sustained
by my breach of contract and still make money. So it would be wealth
maximizing for me to stop deliveries to you. So why shouldn't I? "Be-
cause you promised" is one answer. But did I promise-promise in the
sense that bars me from considering just breaking even as a reason to
break my promise? It is certainly possible for parties to enter a contrac-
tual relationship which does not have this character. We might explicitly
agree that I should, in the above situation, sell for more money and share
some of the additional profit with you by way of compensation for my
breach. I will not try to resolve these issues since my point is just to
show how issues about incommensurability arise in the law. Whatever
the resolution of these issues, it is clear that impracticability raises such
issues-as do various other contract doctrines: frustration, mistake, du-
ress, undue influence, unconscionability. These doctrines all contain a
component that defines what counts as a reason to break a promise. De-
lineating such reasons is one function--one of the main functions-of
contract law.
We could continue with examples, but the three given suffice to
make the point that incommensurability is a pervasive feature of the law.
1992]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
IV. COMPARING THE INCOMPARABLE
Incommensurability raises a special problem for jurisprudence, for,
as we noted earlier, courts are to decide based on the superiority of one
justification over the other. To fulfill this role-to decide on the basis of
the better justification-the courts must sometimes compare the incom-
parable. They must do so in those cases that demand that the court
make a choice among alternatives where the reasons for each alternative
are incommensurable. How is this possible?
It is possible only through relevant changes in evaluative attitudes.
A comparison of two examples makes the point. Recall the sadistic Nazi
example. The mother of the twins must choose which one is to die. But
to choose one over the other requires that she cease to love one, and she
cannot do that at will, so rational decision is impossible. Compare the
sailing example. Confronted with the need to pay $1000, I would aban-
don my commitment to sailing by acknowledging that saving $1000 a
month for retirement is a reason not to sail. I make the incomparable
comparable by a change in my evaluative attitude.
In cases involving incommensurable reasons courts often have to de-
termine whether to make such a change in evaluative attitudes: they have
to decide what to allow and disallow as a reason for action. In Portland
Cement v. Ruckelshaus, for example, the court has to decide what sorts
of feasibility considerations to allow and disallow as potential reasons not
to impose an emissions standard. To take another example, in impracti-
cability cases in contracts, the court has to decide what counts as a rea-
son to break a promise.
How should courts decide such questions? To answer this question,
we should first ask another: how do we-in ordinary life--decide such
questions? It is illuminating here to consider how courts decide from the
perspective of how we decide in ordinary life. In general, we decide what
to do in light of what we value, and, as we noted earlier, the nature of our
valuings is partly defined by the incommensurabilities we acknowledge,
by what we allow and disallow as a reason. This link between valuing
and incommensurability can make it especially problematic to decide in
the face of incommensurabilities. To see why, contrast the sailing exam-
ple with the example of Katrina, the Russian engineer. In the sailing
example, I find it relatively easy to decide that saving $1000 a month for
retirement is a reason not to spend the money on sailing. The reason is
that other things I value-security and longevity, for example-may dic-
tate the choice. Contrast Katrina. We imagined Katrina in awe of the
steppe, where it was constitutive of her awe that she did not take the
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benefits of exploitation to be a reason to "break rocks" and "dig mines."
But we also imagined her as simultaneously having reasons to exploit the
steppe; as an engineer concerned with improving the quality of Russian
life, she sees the steppe as a resource ripe for exploitation. Of course, as
we noted earlier, this means she must be of two minds: she cannot simul-
taneously find a reason to "dig mines" in the benefits of exploitation. The
attitudes alternate. To resolve the conflict, Katrina must abandon one
attitude, and this she may find difficult. The decision is easy-from the
point of view provided by her awe; and, it is also easy-from the engineer-
ing/quality of life perspective. But how is Katrina, who has both points of
view, to decide? The other things she values may not yield any, or any
clear, answer. The reason is that her valuings are constituted by the in-
commensurabilities she acknowledges, by what she allows and disallows
as a reason. The perspective of awe and the quality of life perspective
involve values that allow and disallow different reasons; these-conflict-
ing-attitudes express the values Katrina brings to bear on the situation,
and she may have no other values that bear on this issue in a way that
provides a clear resolution. When she reacts to the steppe with awe, she
undermines any clear basis for decision.
Courts can face a similar dilemma. At first sight, this may seem
wrong. For one thing, courts, unlike Katrina, often have legislation to
guide them. Doesn't legislation often resolve incommensurability issues
and thus provide clear guidance to the courts? Not typically-as Port-
land Cement illustrates. The Clean Air Act does not say what kind of
feasibility considerations can qualify as a reason not to impose an emis-
sion standard. Even when Congress specifically addressed this question
in the 1977 amendment prompted by the Portland Cement decision, it
did not resolve the issue. The amendment merely requires that (prior to
imposing a standard under § 7411) the Administrator shall analyze the
costs of complying, as well as various market effects, and the effects on
energy use. The amendment does not tell the Administrator how to ana-
lyze the costs of compliance; it does not say to what extent feasibility
considerations can count for or against a standard. This is typical; legis-
lation typically provides little guidance about how to resolve incommen-
surabilities. Legislation is general, applying to a broad spectrum of cases;
it typically does not-and, practically speaking in terms of time, money,
and energy, cannot-address all the incommensurabilities that the de-
tailed fact patterns of specific cases force to our attention.
The common law may seem to provide more guidance. After all, we
have seen that it recognizes incommensurability in the form of such doc-
trines as impracticability. But when we look in detail at the doctrines,
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we do not find much guidance about how to handle incommensurabili-
ties. Impracticability doctrine recognizes incommensurabilities created
by promising in its threshold requirement that an unexpected contin-
gency make performance commercially impracticable; but we will not
find much guidance about what counts as commercially impracticable.
Decisions are made on a case-by-case basis with the courts giving little
explanation.
Thus, in cases involving incommensurabilities, courts often face the
same dilemma as Katrina. They have to decide what to allow and disal-
low as a reason where neither legislation, the common law, nor values
provide much guidance. The jurisprudential problem is how to explain
how such decision making is consistent with the institutional demand
that courts decide based on the superiority of one set of reasons over the
others. Prima facie, it is difficult to see how a court can meet this re-
quirement if it is to determine what to allow and disallow as a reason and
neither legislation, the common law, nor values can guide its choice.
What does the court appeal to as a way of showing that one set of reasons
is superior to another, competing set? My point is not that this problem
is unsolvable. My point is that there is a problem to be solved.
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